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1970/05/19

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SECRET/NODIS ATTACHMENT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D C 20520

(21)

May 19, 1970

THE SECRETARY

The attached memorandum regarding the Chinese cancellation of the May 20 Warsaw meeting was originally submitted by EA as an Information Memorandum to you. I asked the Bureau to recast it in the form of a memorandum from you to the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'T. L. Eliot'.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Attachment:

As stated.

File Channing - 145

SECRET/NODIS ATTACHMENT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET/NODIS

TO : S/S-S - Mr. Gleysteen

DATE: May 19, 1970

FROM : EA/ACA - Harry E. T. Thayer

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Warsaw Cancellation

Ambassador Brown has asked me to insure that the Secretary is aware (a) that we have added to the original memorandum to him from Marshall Green and (b) why we have done so.

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, EA is concerned that the text of the original Greenmemorandum might be misconstrued by the President to mean that the moderate Chinese handling of the meeting cancellation has led us to dismiss any concern about Chinese reaction to Indochina developments. This of course is not the case, and we seek to flag that aspect by the addition of the last two paragraphs.

The memorandum's reference to a possible Peking meeting makes the NODIS caveat necessary.

PLC
Chavem - '45

EA/ACA:HETThayer:lgr



5010-106

SECRET/NODIS

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1976

~~SECRET~~

EA REVIEWED 5 Dec DATE 2/8/77
INR 12/1/76 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

INR ✓ MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
S/S(✓)

Subject: Chinese Cancellation of
May 20 Warsaw Meeting

() DOWNGRADE TS to () Sec () C, CADD.

The manner in which the Chinese Communists have handled their cancellation of the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial meeting scheduled for May 20 in Warsaw has led Embassy Warsaw to conclude that the move should be seen as a tactical psychological warfare move rather than an abrupt change in PRC policy regarding its dialogue with the United States.

We agree with this conclusion. The relatively moderate tone in which the Chinese set forth their reason for cancelling the meeting and the fact that they state their interest in continuing the Warsaw dialogue with the U.S. are significant characteristics of their action yesterday. The restraint with which the Chinese have approached this cancellation is underlined by comparison with their handling of the cancellation of the meeting that had been scheduled for February 20, 1969. In last year's case, the Chinese notified us by a letter that (a) said nothing about arrangements for another meeting, (b) attacked the U.S., particularly its role in the defection of the PRC Charge in the Netherlands, in very strong terms, and (c) followed this by an extensive public blast at the U.S., issued formally by the PRC Foreign Ministry.

In yesterday's actions, the Chinese (a) clearly implied a continuing interest in the Warsaw dialogue; (b) attacked the U.S. actions in Indochina in milder terms than circumstances might have permitted, and (c) issued their public statement more routinely as an announcement by the New China News Agency rather than by the Foreign Ministry.

At the same time, Peking's cancellation of this week's meeting, while placing the blame on U.S. actions in Indochina, serves to meet the needs of its relations with

NODIS REVIEW

Cal. B. - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cal. E. - transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cal. C. - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Glenn
Date: 6/30 1978

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SECRET/4-1-53
EA/ACA: HETThayer: lgr

Moscow and Hanoi by pointedly avoiding talking with the U.S. at this stage. Furthermore, it avoids meeting with the U.S. shortly after the Djakarta conference, which Peking has strongly castigated. By this cancellation, Peking might also be seeking to warn the U.S. that our actions in Indochina will have a negative impact on our developing Warsaw dialogue and on prospects for an early meeting in Peking. We assume that Peking welcomes this additional opportunity to subject the Administration to further domestic U.S. criticism flowing from entry into Cambodia.

This memorandum deals only with the implications for our dialogue with Peking of the manner in which the Chinese Communists handled their cancellation of the meeting.

A Special National Intelligence Estimate is being prepared with respect to the broader question of Communist Chinese reactions to developments in Indochina.


William P. Rogers

Clearances: EA - Amb. Brown SECRET/NODIS
S/S -

EA/ACA:HETThayer:lgr 5-19-70